The aim of this work is to analyze tax evasion as a factor that potentially affects internal control of firms as an application of the Chen and Chu's model (2005). For this purpose an experimental approach was employed. Treatments varied depending on whether agents were assumed to be riskneutral or risk-averse. According to the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1993) , results show a positive relationship between wages offered by principal and efforts provided by agents. In general, higher wages lead to more costly effort provision. However, when evasion and risk aversion are introduced in the analysis individuals show opportunistic behaviors and they seem to be less willing to cooperate for the wealth of the firm.
Introduction
In a recent contribution on tax-evading literature, Chen and Chu (2005) present a formal analysis of an agency dilemma in a context of corporate income tax evasion. In particular, they underline the loss of internal control and inefficiency in production generated when a principal (owner of the firm) and an agent (manager of the firm) engage in evasion 1 .
The Chen-Chu model provides the following results. First, if the manager is not punishable for evasion and he does not suffer any loss of utility (by compensating him exactly with the same wage he receives when there is no tax evasion), there is not a distortion in his efforts. Therefore the principal maximizes profits and decides the level of income to be declared to the tax authorities irrespective of the output realized (and consequently of the agent's efforts). Second, the former results no longer hold when the manager becomes liable for evasion. In this case, the principal has to remunerate the agent with a risk premium (in order to compensate him for any risk involved in evasion), regardless of whether the latter is caught or not. An efficient contract should guarantee that the principal bears all the risks for the agent. However, the contract cannot be based on an illegal action and on the different states of the world related to tax evasion. This generates incompleteness and prevents an efficient sharing of risks, which in turn causes a distortion of the manager's efforts and of the incentives he receives in order to participate in tax evasion.
As noted by Joulfaian (2000, p. 1) "…empirical studies of tax evasion…have generally ignored businesses and primarily focused on individual tax compliance with the personal income tax…".
Therefore a contribution to this area of research is timely.
In the present article, I focus on a principal-agent relationship in a context of tax evasion. According to the Chen-Chu model, I show that when there is evasion the introduction of an inefficient sharing of risks leads to different individuals' objectives in reaching firms' profit maximization. In particular, tax evasion influences manager's effort provision. Manager's effort, in turn, determines production. Thus, firms' decisions on output are influenced by those on tax evasion. In addition, as suggested by Chen and Chu (2005) and unlike the case of individual tax evasion, the owner of a firm can decide not to evade taxes even if positive gains are expected from the illegal action because they has to consider the costs due to the efficiency loss of internal control.
Given the difficulties in field data collection in the case of tax evasion, this issue is analyzed using an experimental approach. Laboratory experiments represent nowadays an important source of data for economists. Experiment aims are not to reproduce faithfully a formal model or reality, but to create a design able to offer an analytic explanation of a specific situation and to answer the questions that motivate the research. Usually their designs are quite simple compared to the real world, and even simpler than (relevant) formal models. In a detailed review of the possibilities and limitations of game-theoretic aspects to analyze tax evasion, Torgler (2003) notes, among other elements, that "the strength of game theory is that it makes explicit strategic aspects of social interactions" (Torgler, 2003, p.284) . Therefore, although experiments can be subject to some limitations since they are based on hypothetical scenarios (consequently casting doubts on the external validity of the results), they seem to be useful to provide information about individuals' behavior in particular contexts.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the adopted methodology and a detailed description of the experimental design. Section 3 analyzes the results and provides a discussion of them. Finally, a brief concluding paragraph presents some implications of the study and suggests some themes for further research.
Experimental methodology and design

Method and objectives
The experiment I present in this article considers a simulated labor market and different treatments (depending on whether evasion occurs or not) in which wages are determined by a principal (owner of the firm) according to a linear remuneration scheme. 2 In particular, I analyze a benchmark situation in which there is no evasion, and two other scenarios where the principal evades taxes and receives a penalty and the agent is either 'indirectly' liable for evasion and risk-neutral or 'indirectly' liable for evasion and risk-averse. More specifically, the second and third scenarios could be that of a firm which, after being caught, faces bankruptcy. Here the agent does not directly receive a penalty from the tax authorities (as it is commonly done in the literature), but he may lose all (or part) of the incentive he would obtain after production is realized given the fact that the principal can use this income to pay her fine. These hypothetical scenarios are presented to emphasize the consequences of introducing uncertainty in the analysis.
Available studies on game theoretic models of principal-agent approach have been mainly focused on the determinants of wage and effort decisions (e.g. trust, reciprocity and fairness) in the bargaining process of agency dilemma (see, for example, Guth et al., 1998; Charness, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2007) . Therefore, this is the first study that addresses tax evasion as a causal attribution of different outcomes in an exchange situation. Casual attribution refers to the idea that people need to attribute responsibility for outcomes (Charness, 2004 ). An abundance of experiments on individuals' tax evasion shows the influence of specific elements (e.g. tax rates, audit probability and fines) on the decision to evade taxes or not 3 . Given the nature of the problem this paper wants to analyze (i.e. the distortion of manager's effort in a context of tax evasion) I assume that there is evasion and I place the responsibility of the outcomes to the fact that managers may be risk-averse or not (by modifying the payoff functions of the agents). In order to facilitate the analysis and on the basis of expected utility theory, I try to induce risk aversion by paying expected utility with certainty. This procedure allows excluding the influence of other factors in determining individuals'
payoffs (e.g. an external audit) and focusing on the changes of manager's effort provision in different contexts. While I am not directly trying to capture information about firms' behavior towards tax evasion; the current paper contributes to this area of research by analyzing strategic aspects of social interaction in an experimental environment. As stated by Chen and Chu (2005) , in fact, corporate income tax evasion is much more complicated than an individual portfolio selection problem because it involves the cooperation of more than one person. Therefore, if on the one hand, I believe that this game will reflect the prediction that kindness (i.e. effort level) is proportional to the size of the gift (i.e. the wage); on the other hand, I am expecting that, when the risk of evasion exacerbates the unequal repartition of payoffs between the economic agents, self-interested workers will provide the minimum possible effort in order to maximize their own utility and will not be willing to cooperate for the wealth of the firm by sacrificing part of their income. I analyze these aspects by defining Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the next section 4 .
Experimental design
Participants were students recruited by posting notices at the Universities of Florence and Siena The experiment was run using a computer-aided game designed for this specific purpose and considering a between -subject design. There were, in general, 8 owners and 8 managers in a session with 10 periods 6 . Owners and managers all met in a room. They never met before. After a brief introduction to the experiment, roles were randomly assigned to participants. At the beginning of each session were formed eight pairs of owners and managers. When a pair was matched, partners remained the same and they were anonymous until the end of the session. Owners and managers were matched only once in order to ensure that reputation-formation 7 problems were not a concern.
The experiment was performed as follows. The third one is the game itself.
Before proceeding with the experiment, the payoff functions as well as the relationship between efforts and their costs were shown to participants. They were allowed to run some practice periods without payment to ensure that they understood the payoff and the game mechanism. The outcomes were calculated according to different functions for each treatment considered. Each owner received an initial endowment of 120 tokens in each period. In all cases, the wage offered to the manager (by choosing the incentive coefficient) was subtracted by the initial endowment of the principal. When the experiment was concluded participants were paid privately. In order to make sure subjects were not influenced by ethical considerations (i.e. moral constraints), at the beginning of the game it was decided not to inform them that they were involved in an experiment on tax evasion. The same treatment was maintained throughout the entire session, although each treatment differed about the payoff-generating mechanism.
A basic framework 10 was used as a benchmark for a comparison with other two treatments in which evasion was considered.
In particular, when there was no tax evasion and both parties were risk-neutral, the monetary payoffs were calculated according to:
10 This framework is inspired from a study provided by Charness (2004) . However, the fact that here the wage is dependent on the effort and the incentive rate (instead of being a single transfer to the manager) leads to different equilibrium predictions to that of Charness, where w* = 20 and e* = 0.1 (i.e. in equilibrium there minimum wage and effort are chosen).
where O represents the owner, M the manager, e denotes the manager's effort, w is the wage calculated according to the linear scheme w a be The agent's maximization problem is thus: 
Equation (5) shows that the marginal benefits (b) are equal to the marginal costs of effort (C'(e)).
This also means that e*(b) is an increasing step function. In particular, by using backward induction it is possible to show that any b > 30 induces full effort. Taking into account the payoff functions of the owner and considering the consequent reaction functions of the managers it can be affirmed that one possible subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ( gives the outcome (50, 52). Therefore, principals will try to decrease incentive coefficients at stage three of the experiment. This reduces agent's payoffs. However, they know that by rejecting any new proposal, they are choosing nothing rather than something. For this reason, it is more convenient to accept any offer that gives them any amount whatsoever. If principals understand this they will give managers the smallest amount possible (among those that are able to boost manager's effort) which is actually b = 30. According to the payoff functions, in fact, owner's return is large (low) the larger (lower) the level of efforts and the lower (higher) the incentive coefficients are. For example, at b = 10, effort of 0.1 gives (Owner, Manager) material payoffs (9.9, 21), and effort of 0.5 yields (47.75, 19) ; while at b = 50, effort of 0.1 gives (Owner, Manager) material payoffs (9.5, 25), and effort of 0.5 yields (37.5, 39).
When evasion was considered into the analysis and the manager was 'indirectly' punished for evasion and risk-neutral the payoffs were calculated according to:
where w, e and C(e) are defined as in the first treatment, p is the audit probability (assumed to be equal to 0,3), p(be) is the flexible wage component, which is added to the principal's payoff and detracted from the manager's payoff with probability p, and the last term in the left-hand side of the owner's payoff represents the penalty faced when evasion is detected (that is given by the amount evaded, 20, plus a fine which is assumed to be M = 3*20). 16 Also in this case, backward induction reveals that one SPNE is b* = 43 and e* = 1. In other words, the subgame equilibrium predicts that in order to maximize their utility managers will provide full efforts.
Finally, when the manager was 'indirectly' liable for evasion and risk-averse the monetary payoffs were given by:
15 Expressions (6) and (7) are obtained respectively from: . 16 The values of the probability of being detected from the tax authorities and the fine were chosen according to previous studies on individual's tax evasion (see, for example, Bernasconi and Mittone, 2003) .
where w, e, p, M and C(e) are defined as described in the previous treatments, and the condition (9) represents an additive function of the agent's utility of income 17 minus the disutility of his effort.
In this context, given any value of b, managers will have large payoffs for values of e ≤ 0.3 and negative payoffs for any e > 0.5. On the other hand, principals will receive positive gains from any b ≥ 0 and e ≥ 0.3. Since there is not a dominant strategy to be considered as a Nash equilibrium in all the subgames, it is difficult to make any prevision about a possible SPNE. However, if psychological aspects are relevant (i.e. reciprocity 18 and fairness), I presume to find deviations from pure money maximization results in which managers always select the minimum effort level. In particular, I am expecting that for any b ≥ 0 (and especially for large values of b), managers will provide an effort of 0.3. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. 
Results and discussion
Results (see Table 2 ) indicate that efforts provided by managers are higher in the first two treatments than in the third one (on average they are almost three times the values of efforts in Treat3). The increase of effort over time is higher in Treat1 (25 per cent) than in the second treatment (11.1 per cent), while the decrease of effort in Treat3 is almost 41.2 per cent. This is not surprising since in the third treatment the marginal revenue of effort is considerably lower than that in the two other treatments 19 .
According to the pre-existing principal-agent games (Charness, 2004; and Fehr et al., 1998) , in general all treatments suggest a positive relationship between efforts and wages obtained by choosing incentive coefficients (see Figure 1 ) 20 . In particular, in Treat1 and Treat2, efforts are distributed such that subjects seem not to act with the pure purpose of maximizing their own financial interest (by selecting always e = 1 for any b ≥ 30) showing, in general, a contingent willingness to cooperate for the common wealth. Although data suggest that higher incentive coefficients lead to higher efforts, they seem also to reveal a departure from the equilibrium.
According to predictions, I was expecting to find that, given an effort of 1, the incentive coefficient Table 2 suggests that similar considerations can be done for efforts and wages determined by incentive coefficients selected by owners at stage one of each treatment. These findings can be explained not only by distributional models (see Bolton, 1991; Fehr and Shmidt, 1999) , but also by reciprocal considerations and fairness (see Rabin, 1993) .
On the one hand, as suggested by distributional models, the positive relationship between efforts and wages can be a consequence of manager's volition of avoiding greater disparities generated either by minimum or higher effort provision. On the other hand, according to the notion of reciprocal altruism, it seems that payoffs are determined taking into consideration individual kindness. In particular, it can be argued that principal's kindness affects manager's willingness to Note: wages are calculated using incentive coefficients offered at stage three of the experiment.
As stated in the previous section, if psychological aspects were important I predicted that in Treat3 individuals directed effort choices towards e = 0.3. However, results contradict this prediction.
Specifically, the percentage of managers that chose e = 0.3 equals those who chose e ≤ 0.3. This behavior is exacerbated through the end of the session. Efforts in period 10, in fact, are considerably lower than that in period 1 (see Figure 2) . Therefore, findings suggest that when there is an unequal sharing of risks between individuals, there is a tendency to act in an opportunistic way. Examples of this can also be seen in effort's choices when incentive coefficients increase (see Appendix B): the percentage of subjects that chose e ≤ 0.3 when b ≥ 80 was 16.25, with respect to the 6.25 per cent of those who chose e = 0.3. Given all this, it is not surprising that reciprocal considerations matter more for the first two treatments than for Treat3. In particular, individuals seem to move from a fair distribution of outcomes (by choosing an effort e = 0.3) to a pure money-maximization situation in which managers always select the minimum effort level, and principals receive negative payoffs. As predicted by the Chen-Chu model, here agents are not acting in the interest of the firm by giving therefore support to the prediction of loss of internal control.
The experimental payoff structure confirms these conclusions. Results show that outcomes reach an equitable distribution in the first two treatments (see Table 3 ). This may be a consequence of the parties' risk-neutrality, providing that when individuals are risk-neutral they behave in a similar manner in alternative situations regardless of other considerations (i.e. the presence of evasion or not). By contrast, in Treat3 managers' payoffs are always higher than those of principals.
A further implication of the distribution of payoffs is that in Treat1 and Treat2 individuals are not looking for efficiency by increasing the total payoff of the group and the minimum payoff for any player (see Charness and Rabin, 2002) , but choices seem to reduce inequality among subjects. To
give an example, when the wage is in the range 35 ≤ b ≤ 43 (in Treat2), the manager receives less than the owner of the firm. By choosing non maximum effort managers reduce the total payoffs as well as the minimum payoff but increase equality between subjects. For instance, at b = 41 effort of 1 leads to (Owner, Manager) monetary payoffs (47.3, 30.7), while an effort of 0.6 gives (28.62, 29.02). In this range, effort lower than the maximum level are provided 7.5 per cent (6/80) of the time. The same considerations can be done for an incentive coefficient higher than 43. In this case, manager payoffs start to increase and principal payoffs decrease. If efficiency and money maximization considerations were relevant, I was expecting that an incentive coefficient of 50 led to an effort of 1 (since this increases the total payoff). However, by choosing non maximum effort, managers tend to decrease both the total and the minimum payoffs, but they increase equality between parties. For b = 50, e = 0.9 gives (Owner, Manager) outcomes (39, 36.5), while an effort of 1 leads to (41, 37) monetary payoffs. In this range, almost the 44 per cent (35/80) of individuals chose efforts e < 1. Similar arguments arise when considering other incentive coefficient ranges in both treatments.
The results above are also strengthening by the fact that the managers reject always the contract (strike) when principals decrease strategically the amount of incentive coefficients at stage three of the experiment (which in turn increases their final payoffs by reducing managers' payoffs). This is in accordance with Fehr and Schimdt (1999) who develop the notion of self-centered inequality aversion and state that individuals generally dislike inequalities, but they care more about them when they are in a relative disadvantageous situation (i.e. they have a lower payoff if compared to others). An additional relevant aspect emerging from results (see Table 2 and Appendix C) is that the average incentive coefficients chosen by principals vary much across periods. In particular, they show a significant trend upward over time. As the average incentive coefficient chosen at stage one of the experiment tends to be always 21 above the empirically optimal incentive coefficient (as defined in previous section) almost in all treatments it can be argued that principals had a good knowledge of how agents would have reacted and understood that higher effort level would have been expected with higher incentive coefficient choices. A possible concern in principal-agent experiments is represented by repeat-game effects. In particular, one explanation of costly effort provision and higher level of incentive coefficient can be that agents and principals respectively are attempting to develop a reputation. Although the design of the experiment is meant to rule out individual reputations, it could still be possible that subjects would try to develop one. This can be checked by testing for changes in subjects' choices over time 21 The only exception is given by period 1 in Treat2, where the average incentive coefficient is lower than 43 (see Table  2 above). (Charness, 2004) . In particular, if reputation were important the level of effort and the difference between incentive coefficients offered at stage one and three of the experiment should be expected to decrease near the end of the session. Regression results are presented in Appendix D. They show that average effort decreases (by 0.013) with time in Treat3 at a statistically significant rate (at the 1 per cent level) and follows an increasing pattern in the other two treatments although it is not statistically significant for Treat2. However, the difference between incentive coefficients offered in the first and third stage of the experiment tends to increase over time in all treatments. The increase is statistically significant in Treat1 and Treat2, and to a lower extent in Treat3 (at the 10 per cent level).
According to these considerations, it seems that in Treat3 managers attempt to develop a reputation.
Therefore, the presence of a substantial time trend (see Appendix C) and the comparison across regressions seem to confirm reputation effects in Treat3. These findings strengthen the conclusion that, when there is tax evasion and managers are risk-averse they are more likely to behave in an opportunistic way in order to maximize their utility. This in turn leads to negative owner's payoffs.
Therefore it is possible to conclude that tax evasion decisions may have an impact on firm's production. Furthermore, according to Chen and Chu (2005) this implies that a firm which intends to engage in tax evasion needs to balance the trade-off between two relevant aspects. On the one hand, tax evasion can boost expected after-tax income. On the other hand, the firm bears both the risk of being detected from the tax authorities and the costs due to the loss of internal control. Thus, if owners act in a rational way (based on expectations on manager's behavior), they will be discouraged to evade taxes. In fact, as shown from the payoff distribution in the experiment, in many cases the costs of evasion may appear considerably higher than gains.
The argument above supports also the idea that in the presence of tax evasion, if penalties are imposed on the manager rather than on the shareholders (principals) they are more efficient in deterring tax evasion. As suggested by Crocker and Slemrod (2005) , the intuition here is that when there is asymmetric information a sanction imposed on shareholders affects a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) only indirectly through the second best compensation contract. Consequently, a sanction that is directly applicable on the CFO appears to be more efficient in reducing tax evasion because it exacerbates the conflict (i.e. the different interests) between the principal and the manager when they participate in the illegal action.
Conclusions
This study considers information about individuals' strategic behavior in the context of corporate tax evasion. In particular, in order to investigate the relevance of tax evasion on the loss of internal control (i.e. the distorting effect of tax evasion on the provision of manager's effort) a laboratory experiment was conducted at the Universities of Florence and Siena (Italy).
The experiment includes three different treatments: one in which there is no evasion, and other two treatments in which there is evasion and the manager is considered either 'indirectly' liable for evasion and risk-neutral or 'indirectly' liable for evasion and risk-averse. According to previous findings in the literature (see, for example, Fehr et al., 1998; Charness, 2004) , results show in general a positive relationship between effort chosen by agents and wage offered by principals.
However, in the third treatment the introduction of risk aversion leads individuals to frequently act with the purpose of pure money-maximization by selecting the minimum effort. This provides evidence that when agents bear part of the risk for evasion they are less willing to cooperate for the wealth of the firm. According to this, reciprocity and fairness seem to matter more in the first two treatments. When subjects, in fact, are considered risk-neutral they try to push choices towards a fair distribution of payoffs. Results also illustrate that reputation effects seem to play a role in the third treatment giving support to the idea that, under uncertainty (generated by evasion) risk-averse individuals tend to show opportunist behavior. In addition, the fact that in the third treatment findings seem to confirm the expected predictions of loss of internal control and that in general participants with the role of 'principals' well understood the game mechanism (by frequently choosing high incentive coefficients) seem to provide evidence that the experiment was properly designed. However, since the number of observation is limited, results must be interpreted with caution. Further improvements can be made by increasing the sample size and performing additional experiments.
Appendix A Instructions
Welcome to this experiment! Introduction to the experiment This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The University of Siena and the University of Genoa (Italy) have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. A person has been chosen as the monitor, who will check that the instructions are followed as they appear here. However, he will not answer any questions during this experiment. If you have any doubts, you should read back through these instructions and go through the practice periods. At the end of this session, I will answer publicly eventual questions. Now that the experiment has begun, I ask that you do not talk at all during this experiment. If you follow these instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be given to you in cash at the end of the experiment. In addition, each person will be given 5 Euros as a show-up fee for this experiment.
Instructions Each of the participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups A, B. Players A will be 'owners', players B will be 'managers.' Each player A will be anonymously randomly paired with only one player B. You will not be told who the person you are paired with is, either during or after the experiment. The only information you will have is the decisions taken by the person to which you are paired with. Neither the monitors nor the other participants will be able to associate your choices to your name. At the start of the experiment, each owner A will be given 120 tokens as endowment. Each manager B will not receive any endowment. The experimental procedure is divided in four stages. At the first stage each owner A offers manager B remunerations. The remuneration scheme is given by a fixed component (20 tokens) and a flexible component obtained from the product of an incentive coefficient c (between 0 and 100 tokens, inclusive) and a level of effort e (between 0.1 and 1, inclusive), offered by the manager, such that: Compensation = 20 + (c)*(e) The first decision taken by the owner is, therefore, the value of the incentive coefficient c to offer to the paired manager. In the second stage, each manager B will determine how much she/he wants to work (quantity or amount of effort). In the third stage, owner A decides if to confirm or to modify the offered incentive coefficient at the effort chosen by the paired manager B. In the fourth and last stage, manager B decides if to accept or to reject the final incentive coefficient offered by the paired owner A. If manager B accepts, owner A and manager B obtain the income calculated according to the formula described below. If manager B rejects, owner A and manager B do not receive any income.
Stage 1
Each owner A will be shown the following screen (the screens below are only examples): 
Calculate
The incentive coefficient will be that offered by the paired owner A. The manager B, then, will choose the level of effort e (between 0.1 and 1, inclusive) that cannot be later modified and that is associated to a certain cost, C(e) (given in tokens), according to the following table: In the lower box, the manager can press the button 'Calculate' in order to calculate the income obtained by the parties for each pair incentive coefficient/effort. After taken her/his decision, the manager B will press OK.
Stage 3
Each owner A will be shown the following screen: 
Calculate
The shown effort will be that offered at Stage 2 by the paired manager B. In the lower box, each owner A can press the button 'Calculate' in order to calculate the income obtained for each pair incentive coefficient/effort. If the manager A confirms the offered incentive coefficient, she/he presses the button "Confirm". If the manager A does not confirm the offered incentive coefficient, she/he presses the button "Modify". In this case, the following screen will appear: 
The manager B, thus, has two possible choices: 1. To accept the final incentive coefficient offered by the paired owner A and to pay the chosen level of effort, e. In this case, the incomes of subjects A and B will be calculated according to the following formula: 2. To reject the final offered incentive coefficient and to pay the level of effort chosen in Stage 2, without receiving any income. Also in this screen, in the lower box each manager can calculate the income obtained by the parties for each pair incentive coefficient/effort. After each manager B has taken his/her decision, all the participants (A and B) will be shown a screen in which the received incomes (positive or negative) are shown. This four stage procedure will be repeated 10 times and in each repetition each of you will be paired with the same person. Your total income for the participation in this experiment will be the sum of the earnings (positive or negative) in each of the ten periods. At the end of the experiment, tokens will be converted into euros at the rate of: 23 60 tokens = 1 euro Before we start the experiment, you will run through some practice periods. This will be performed as described in the instructions, except for two changes. You will not receive a prize for your actions, and you will have another opportunity for questions to the experimenter at the end of practice. You will also have some time to examine the tables and the formula.
Thank you for participating in the experiment! 23 The exchange rate for Treat2 and Treat3 were 50 tokens (= 1 euro) and 10 tokens (= 1 euro), respectively.
Appendix B
Distribution of incentive coefficient and effort Note: average incentive coefficients refer to those offered at stage one of the experiment. 
Appendix D Reputation effect
